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Article

Who Benefited from the Bailout?
Jonathan G. Katz†
INTRODUCTION
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created to
respond to a financial panic.1 Some might say that it was
created in panic. Congress appropriated a huge sum of money,
gave the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(Treasury) enormous latitude to spend the money, and provided
ambiguous and, some might say, contradictory direction on the
goals and objectives of TARP.2 Treasury, in turn, gave clear
guidance on how it proposed to use the money—to purchase
deeply discounted toxic assets from troubled financial institutions—only to shift directions within weeks, when it used
TARP funds to make capital investments in banks.3
On October 3, 2010, the TARP program’s authority to initiate new spending officially ended.4 However, as with so much
of TARP, even the program’s expiration of authority did not really mean that the program terminated. It only meant that
Treasury could not initiate new TARP spending programs. It
† Jonathan G. Katz was Secretary of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for twenty years. Since his retirement in January 2006,
Mr. Katz has served as a consultant on financial services regulation and a
technical advisor to government regulators in twelve countries. Mr. Katz is
grateful for the many constructive comments he received on drafts of this Article from, among others, Roger Arner, Zsofia Arvai, James Coffman, and Larry Promisel. Copyright © 2011 by Jonathan G. Katz.
1. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 438–46 (2009).
2. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 164 (2010) (noting
that TARP gave “the treasury secretary virtually unlimited power to use the
money as he saw fit”).
3. Id. at 167–68.
4. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-10-04, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2010)
[hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010], available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/October2010_Quarterly_Report_to_
Congress.pdf.
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could still spend nearly $80 billion in “obligated” but unspent
funds.5 These funds are in addition to the over $98 billion in
TARP funds that have been spent and not repaid.6
The controversy over its creation and the ambiguity of its
termination are consistent with virtually every chapter in the
life of TARP. Throughout its life, the TARP program was misunderstood by the public and misconstrued by the media.7 This
is puzzling, given the level of independent oversight that the
program received. When Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and created TARP, it
also created two independent overseers. EESA mandated the
appointment of a special inspector general for the TARP program (SIGTARP) and required the SIGTARP to submit quarterly reports to Congress.8 It also created a bipartisan Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) and required it to submit regular
reports to Congress.9 The reports of the SIGTARP and the COP
provide an unusually robust and highly independent ongoing
assessment of TARP. The picture they paint is illuminating
and, in many respects, different from the prevailing public impression.
To fully understand TARP and the government’s broader
response to the financial crisis, one should follow the famous
advice that Mark Felt (Deep Throat) is said to have given
Woodward and Bernstein—“follow the money.” In doing so, the
money trail reveals that the funds expended by TARP were in
fact merely one component of a much larger governmental intervention that was remarkably similar to governmental responses to past banking failures. And, absent fundamental
changes in bank business practices and governmental regulation, other banks will fail and the government will respond
with other bailouts in the future.
Part I of this Article describes the government’s actions in
the financial crisis of 2008, beginning with the collapse of Bear
Stearns. Part II follows the money with respect to both TARP
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 530 (noting the general misunderstanding of TARP when it was enacted); see also Alan Blinder, Op-Ed., Government
to the Economic Rescue, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at A21 (“TARP must be
among the most reviled and misunderstood programs in the history of the republic.”).
8. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 111-343,
§ 121(a), (f ), 122 Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790.
9. Id. § 125.
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and non-TARP funds and assesses those interventions. Part III
contains a brief summary of past banking failures in the United
States, demonstrating that the government’s intervention was
not out of the ordinary. It also discusses how fundamental
changes in the banking business model, coupled with significant industry consolidation, will have consequences for future
bank failures, which are inevitable. This Article concludes with
some observations on what regulators must address to reduce
the consequences of future failures.
“To paraphrase a great wartime leader, never in the field of
financial endeavour has so much money been owed by so few to
so many. And, one might add, so far with little real reform.”10
I. THE PRE-TARP MONEY TRAIL
The story of the financial crisis and the government’s response does not begin with congressional enactment of TARP.
Part I describes the government’s inconsistent responses to
three financial failures—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and
AIG.
A. BEAR STEARNS
When banks fail, banking regulators historically struggle
to reconcile two frequently conflicting goals—intervening to
prevent a single failure from metastasizing into a systemic
failure, or refraining from intervention because of a concern
that such action will encourage future reckless conduct (the
“moral hazard” problem).11 In March 2008, with the collapse of
Bear Stearns, federal regulators were confronted with this
choice.12
Bear Stearns (Bear) was a broker-dealer rather than a
bank.13 It was a major and active participant in the debt markets where it was one of the largest underwriters of subprime
10. Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of Eng., Speech to Scottish Business Organizations 3 (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf (emphasis added).
11. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing concerns of moral hazard
associated with the 2008 bailout); Lissa L. Broome, Extraordinary Government
Intervention to Bolster Bank Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 137, 147–
54 (describing the rationale and risks associated with government bailouts).
12. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 69.
13. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, REP. NO. 446-A, SEC’S OVERSIGHT
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM 5 (2008), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/
2008/446-b.pdf.
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mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and of collateralized debt obligations (CDO),14 and was also a major participant in the overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives markets.15 As a broker-dealer, it
relied on its own capital (raised through equity or long-term
debt) and money borrowed largely through short-term secured
transactions (repos) with other banks and financial institutions
for liquidity.16 In March 2008 Bear’s “overall financing from
other banks totaled $119 billion.”17 As the concern over the
firm’s solvency spread, some lenders began insisting on more
collateral for continued lending and other lenders refused to
rollover expiring loans.18 The premium to obtain insurance
against a Bear default, known as a credit default swap (CDS),
increased 1400 percent in one week.19 At the beginning of
March, Bear had far more in liquid assets than U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations required.20 Within weeks, it did not.21
In this instance, the regulators focused on the systemic
risk problem.22 It was the classic government response; the
14. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT,
GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21
(2010) [hereinafter FCIC STAFF REPORT], available at http://fcicstatic.law
.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-08-31%20Preliminary%20Staff%20Report
-%20Too%20Big%20To%20Fail%20Institutions.pdf.
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 39 (2009)
[hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf.
16. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 158–59.
17. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS 18 (2009) (quoting Kate Kelly,
The Fall of Bear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at A1.
18. On March 10 Rabobank, a Dutch bank, declined to roll over a $500
million loan and informed Bear that it was “unlikely to renew a $2 billion line
of credit coming due the following week.” COHAN, supra note 17, at 18. “The
next morning, ING Group NV, another large Dutch bank, followed Rabobank’s
lead and pulled its $500 million in short-term financing.” Id. at 23. Similarly,
mutual funds such as Fidelity ($6 billion) and Federated ($4.5 billion) also
stopped long-standing, overnight repos with Bear. Id. at 33.
19. See id. at 21.
20. Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the
Credit Crisis for the Future of Regulation Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec
.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm.
21. Id.
22. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 69 (according to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the impetus for the Bear Stearns Bailout was the “protection of the

1572

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1568

government brokered a “private sector” solution. J.P. Morgan
(JPM) acquired Bear Stearns,23 which was something like an
arranged marriage between a large insolvent entity and a larger solvent entity made possible by a dowry from the couple’s
rich and loving Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam’s wedding present included a $12.9 billion short-term loan to JPM to facilitate the
purchase24 and the creation of Maiden Lane LLC (ML I), a special-purpose vehicle25 (SPV) to remove $30 billion of toxic debt
from the consolidated balance sheet—something like paying
down the bride’s credit cards.26 ML I was financed by a $1 billion contribution from JPM and a $29 billion loan from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed).27 Graciously,
JPM agreed to assume responsibility for the first billion in
losses.28
To make the newlyweds’ adjustment easier, the government also gave JPM unprecedented regulatory relief. For the
first time, the Federal Reserve (Fed) did not require the acquiring bank to consolidate the acquisition onto its balance sheet
for regulatory capital calculations for eighteen months.29 The
couple also got a starter home, Bear’s $1.5 billion dollar office
tower on Madison Avenue.30
It was a lovely wedding and one that appears to have had a
happy ending. JPM repaid the bridge loan within days, including $4 million in interest.31 As of June 30, 2010, SIGTARP reports that while the balance on the ML I loan was $29.3 billion,
the fair market value of the assets was $28.4 billion.32 Since
American financial system and the protection of the American economy”).
23. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 159.
24. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-10-03, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 135 (2010)
[hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010], available at http://www
.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/July2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
25. A special-purpose vehicle is “an off-balance sheet legal entity that
holds the transferred assets presumptively beyond the reach of the entities
providing the assets (e.g., legally isolated).” OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-03,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 95 (2009) [hereinafter SIGTARP
QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/
congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
26. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 21.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. COHAN, supra note 17, at 101.
30. Id. at 125.
31. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 134.
32. Id.
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JPM agreed to assume the first $1 billion in losses, it appears
to be a net wash for the government. Not bad.
B. LEHMAN BROTHERS
Just a few months later, regulators were again confronted
with the choice of addressing systemic risk or moral hazard
when Lehman Brothers (Lehman) failed, in much the same
way as Bear Stearns.33 Following the national criticism of the
Bear “bailout,” which in the end was not actually a bailout, the
regulators chose to address moral hazard rather than systemic
risk.34 While the government actively encouraged the JPM
takeover of Bear, participating in the negotiation of terms and
providing substantial financial assistance and regulatory relief,
it took a different approach with Lehman. In hindsight, this
was an odd choice. Lehman was a larger firm than Bear, with
$600 billion in outstanding debt, on which CDSs with a notional amount totaling $400 billion had been written.35
The government did approach Bank of America and Barclays Bank (Barclays) in the United Kingdom regarding a private solution to the Lehman problem.36 While Barclays was interested, Uncle Sam wouldn’t promise the same dowry that
JPM obtained.37 There was no short-term loan for acquisition,
no Maiden Lane SPV to take on Lehman’s toxic debt, and no
promise of regulatory relief to ease the consolidation.38 Fed
Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, then-Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Paulson, and current Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner (who was at that time president of the N.Y. Fed) have
consistently explained that no intervention was possible because they lacked legal authority to do so.39 However, this ex33. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 173.
34. See id. at 162.
35. Peter J. Wallison, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis, AM. ENTER.
INST. 4 (Oct. 2008), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081031_23536OctFSOg.pdf.
36. COHAN, supra note 17, at 432–33.
37. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 271 (“Before the call ended, [Barclay’s
President Bob] Diamond wanted to make another thing clear: He was looking
for a ‘Jamie Deal’—in other words, he might come looking for some form of
government help. Paulson stated firmly that no assistance from the government would be forthcoming, but added, ‘We’ll figure out how to get you help.’”).
38. Id.
39. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, 112th Cong. 61 (2010) (testimony of Ben. S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0902-Transcript
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planation is based upon their inability under section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act to lend money to Lehman because the
firm lacked sufficient acceptable collateral to support the
loan.40 Of course the loan could have been made to Barclays,
not Lehman, just as JPM was the borrower in the Bear deal. It
is difficult to understand why a Barclays-Lehman deal on the
same terms as JPM-Bear was not legal. One explanation is that
this was a choice that reflected timing more than underlying
facts. After Bear, and just after the government bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the political fallout may have been
too great. Whatever the reason,41 there was no arranged marriage. Lehman was left at the altar, or more accurately, at the
funeral home next door to the church.
The government’s unanticipated about-face surprised and
panicked an already panicked and fragile market.42 Because
markets do not cope well with surprise and panic, the market
response was disastrous.43
Actually, the Lehman bankruptcy may never end. Legal
fees alone have passed the $1 billion mark.44 Parenthetically,
by October 2008 all $400 billion of CDSs in which Lehman was
the intermediary dealer, plus the $72 billion in CDSs written
on a Lehman failure, was settled by the Depository Trust
Clearing Corporation among the CDS counterparties for a net
total payment of $5.2 billion.45

.pdf (“Lehman did not have enough collateral in terms of financial assets, and
its going-concern value was tied up completely in its financial operations.”).
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
41. There is a great deal of speculation as to why Barclays did not buy
Lehman (it did buy the broker-dealer subsidiary). The official explanation was
that it was unable to obtain from the U.K. Financial Services Agency a waiver
of the requirement that a shareholder vote be taken to approve the acquisition. For a discussion of the official decisions, see SORKIN, supra note 1, at
345–49. Unofficially, some believe that the Bank of England insisted on U.S.
government participation akin to the JPM-Bear deal.
42. Id. at 536.
43. Id. at 535 (“‘On the day that Lehman went into Chapter 11,’ Alan
Blinder, an economist and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, said,
‘everything just fell apart.’”).
44. Lehman Bankruptcy Fees Top $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct.
19, 2010, 3:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/lehman-bankruptcy
-fees-top-1-billion/.
45. Peter J. Wallison, Everything You Wanted to Know About Credit Default Swaps—but Were Never Told, AM. ENTER. INST., 1 (Dec. 2008), http://
www.aei.org/docLib/20090107_12DecFSOg.pdf.
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C. AIG
The AIG crisis presented regulators with a third opportunity to choose between systemic risk and moral hazard. Following the disastrous market reaction to the decision not to intervene in Lehman, the regulatory choice was not a surprise. AIG
was an enormous global insurance company (in fact the largest), with a blue chip balance sheet (in 2005 it was one of only
eight U.S. companies with a AAA bond rating).46 What made
AIG integral to the global banking system was its derivatives
business—originating CDSs on specific debt instruments,
largely MBSs and structured products. When it collapsed, the
notional value of AIG open derivatives contracts was $2.7 trillion, with $1 trillion of it concentrated in twelve counterparties,
all financial institutions.47 By purchasing a CDS, banks could
avoid writing down—for regulatory capital calculations—the
value of the security covered by the CDS.48 In 2008 alone, AIG
had written more than $300 billion in CDSs for banks.49 If AIG
failed, banks relying upon these CDSs would be forced to take
enormous reductions in regulatory capital calculations.50
At the direction of the Treasury and the Fed, the N.Y. Fed
provided immediate relief through an $85 billion line of credit
(called a Revolving Credit Facility (RCF)) and received in exchange 79.9 percent of the company.51 The deal was structured
on the basis of a draft term sheet put together the previous day
for a private-sector solution, which the private sector turned
down.52 In response, the government made only one change in
46. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 139.
47. Id. at 202.
48. The banking industry reliance on AIG to “insure” questionable CDO’s
is evocative of Dickens’s definition of insurance: “[a] person who can’t pay, gets
another person who can’t pay, to guarantee that he can pay.” Richard Fisher,
Paradise Lost: Addressing Too Big to Fail, 30 CATO J. 323, 324 (2010) (quoting
CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 259 (London, Macmillan & Co. ed. 1895)).
49. SORKIN, supra note 1, at 395.
50. The Congressional Oversight Panel estimated that seven European
banks received $16 billion in regulatory relief from AIG swap transactions. See
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS
IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 92 fig.21 (2010)
[hereinafter COP JUNE 2010 REPORT].
51. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 26.
52. The SIGTARP audit, which was issued on November 17, 2009, found,
among other things, that the terms of the original N.Y. Fed financing did not
result from independent analysis, but were simply an adoption of the term
sheet from an aborted private financing discussion, and those terms, which
included an onerous effective interest rate of eleven percent, made modification of the terms and further government action inevitable. OFFICE OF THE
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the terms. Instead of agreeing to a $75 billion RCF, it added
$10 billion as a cushion.53
This credit line was the beginning, not the end, of government assistance to AIG. Subsequently, Treasury provided AIG
with $40 billion from TARP funds under the Systemically Significant Financial Institutions program (SSFI).54 AIG was the
only recipient of funds under SSFI.55 AIG used the $40 billion
to partially pay down the N.Y. Fed RCF,56 which was lowered
from $85 billion to $60 billion.57 TARP also created an equity
capital facility that AIG could access for up to $29.8 billion.58
This was not the end of government assistance. The N.Y. Fed
provided additional financial assistance through the creation of
Maiden Lane II and III, perhaps the most interesting part of
the AIG story.
The N.Y. Fed created Maiden Lane II (ML II), a SPV, and
loaned it $22.5 billion to purchase deeply discounted residential
MBSs from AIG, which then used the cash to close out its securities lending facility’s open positions.59 AIG thereby reduced
its balance sheet, gained some liquidity, and reacquired the
lent securities to bolster the balance sheets of its insurance
subsidiaries.60 Since ML II received these securities at a deep
discount, they were likely full collateral for the loaned funds.61
Next, the N.Y. Fed created Maiden Lane III (ML III) and
loaned it $30 billion to deal with AIG’s open CDSs.62 In addition to the collateral already held by the counterparties, ML III
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGQR-10-01, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2010) [hereinafter SIGTARP
QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/
reports/congress/2010/January2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
53. Id.
54. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 60.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 148 (“The $40 billion [of TARP money injected into AIG
through the SSFI program] took some of the pressure off the first Federal Reserve line of credit, allowing ‘the Federal Reserve to reduce from $85 billion to
$60 billion the total amount available under the credit facility.’” (quoting BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 51 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/20090224_mprfullreport.pdf )).
58. Id. at 60.
59. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 71.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 74.
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agreed to pay the full market value of the open CDSs.63 The net
effect was to give those counterparties the full notional value of
their securities.64 The COP and SIGTARP both concluded that
the ML III deal grossly overpaid the CDS holders by an estimated $78 billion.65 “Treasury had received back about 66 cents
worth of obligations for each dollar it paid.”66
ML II and ML III did not signal the end of government assistance to AIG. In 2009 the N.Y. Fed received $25 billion of
preferred equity interests from AIG in two SPVs formed to hold
two of AIG’s largest foreign life insurance subsidiaries, AIA
Group Ltd. and ALICO, and the RCF was lowered by $25 billion to $35 billion.67 The purpose of the exchange was to enable
AIG to sell the two foreign subsidiaries.68 In November 2010
AIG conducted an initial public offering (IPO) of AIA Group
Ltd. stock in Hong Kong, raising $20.5 billion.69 At the same
time, AIG sold ALICO to MetLife for MetLife stock and cash totaling $16.2 billion.70 In order to complete these transactions,
AIG borrowed $22 billion from TARP to repurchase the N.Y.
Fed’s preferred equity interests in the two SPV’s that held
these subsidiaries.71 AIG also agreed to use the proceeds of the
IPO and ALICO sale to pay down the existing N.Y. Fed loan.72
AIG will also transfer the shares it retained in AIA Group Ltd.
63. Id. at 75.
64. See id. at 71 (“The differences between ML2 and ML3 must be emphasized. ML2 purchased deeply discounted securities from AIG, which was then
able to use the proceeds of those sales to close out related obligations. In contrast, in ML3 . . . the SPV purchased securities from AIG’s counterparties in
transactions, the net effect of which was to give those counterparties the full
notional value of their securities.”).
65. TARP Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (testimony of
Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel) [hereinafter Warren Testimony], available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/
testimony_of_elizabeth_warren022409.pdf.
66. Id.
67. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 71.
68. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 60–61
(“Two of AIG’s largest foreign life insurance businesses . . . have been put into
special purpose vehicles (‘SPVs’) with significant preferred stock interests in
those SPVs used to pay down the Federal Reserve Revolving Credit Facility.”).
69. David Lawder, AIG to Get $22 Billion in TARP Funds for Fed Exit,
REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE
6A03EK20101102.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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and the MetLife shares it received in the ALICO sale to the
Treasury.73
As of June 30, 2010, AIG had not repaid any TARP funds,
and had elected not to pay $5.5 billion in scheduled dividends.74
AIG’s total government assistance was $181 billion, with more
than $127 billion outstanding as of September 1, 2010.75
The AIG bailout was, of course, a response to the systemic
risk fear.76 After the market panic in response to Lehman, this
was understandable. But the true beneficiaries were not AIG,
its shareholders, or its insurance policyholders. AIG’s shareholders were largely wiped out. Its policyholders were already
protected by state insurance funds.77
The real beneficiaries of the government’s actions were
AIG creditors and counterparties to open AIG positions. The
list of counterparties and the corresponding amount of government funds they received, which the Fed originally refused to
disclose,78 is illuminating:79
Goldman Sachs: $12.9 billion
Société Générale: $11.9 billion80
73. See id. (reporting the details of these transactions).
74. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
ASSESSING THE TARP ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 25 fig.2 (2010) [hereinafter COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT].
75. See id.
76. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 394 –95 (describing the hectic and panicked communications among Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and N.Y. Fed President Tim Geithner—and others—at
the time of AIG’s bailout).
77. But cf. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 87 & n.408 (noting
that because of the magnitude of AIG, it is possible that some state insurance
guaranty funds may not have been able to pay off all insurance claims (citing
Eric Dinallo, Op-Ed., What I Learned at the AIG Meltdown: State Insurance
Regulation Wasn’t the Problem, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2010, at A17)).
78. The Federal Bailout of AIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Neil Barofsky,
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program) [hereinafter
Barofsky statement], available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
Hearings/pdfs/20100127barofsky.pdf (“Federal Reserve officials initially refused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or the details of the payments, warning that disclosure of the names would undermine AIG’s stability,
the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of
the markets.”).
79. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 94 –95.
80. The New York Times reported that Goldman Sachs also received a
significant amount of the money paid to Société Générale and possibly Calyon,
which apparently bought CDS from AIG on behalf of Goldman. Gretchen Mor-
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Deutsche Bank: $11.8 billion
Barclays: $7.9 billion
Merrill Lynch: $6.8 billion
Bank of America: $5.2 billion
UBS: $5.0 billion
BNP Paribas: $4.9 billion
HSBC: $3.5 billion
Calyon (Crédit Agricole): $2.4 billion

These top ten AIG counterparties received $72.2 billion of
government funds via ML III.81 It is noteworthy that all but
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America are foreign banks. It is also noteworthy that in some cases, such as
Goldman Sachs, more money was paid via ML III than was
provided directly through the TARP capital purchase program.82 After receiving $12.9 billion for its AIG open positions,
Goldman reacquired the preferred stock it had issued to the
government under TARP by repaying the $10 billion it received
(plus $1.1 billion for the warrants).83
II. FOLLOWING THE MONEY
The story of governmental assistance to financial institutions and financial markets is complicated. It involved many
government agencies, and many discrete programs and strategies. It involved capital infusions into individual banks, guarantees against loss to support specific securities as well as
pools of securities, the purchase of pools of securities, and the
purchase of securities in the secondary market. Section A describes the efforts using funds appropriated by Congress in
TARP. Section B describes the larger, more complex, and less
transparent efforts undertaken by the government outside of
the TARP program.

genson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to
Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 2580032.
81. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 94.
82. Goldman received $10 billion in TARP funds. SIGTARP QUARTERLY
REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 45 fig.2.5.
83. See ROBERT POZEN, TOO BIG TO SAVE? 79 fig.4.4, 383–84 (2010); Steven M. Davidoff, Chump Change from Goldman, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July
23, 2009, 12:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/chump-change
-from-goldman/.
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A. FOLLOWING THE TARP MONEY
Congress authorized Treasury to use TARP in a manner
that “protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts,
and life savings; . . . preserves homeownership and promotes
jobs and economic growth; . . . [and] maximizes overall returns
to the taxpayers of the United States.”84 It appropriated $700
billion in funding for TARP.85 In fact, TARP never spent this
much. As of October 2010, Treasury had spent $388 billion and
obligated to spend an additional $82 billion.86 Thirteen different programs were announced during the life of TARP.87 Some
were never implemented or implemented in only token ways.88
A description of ten of the thirteen programs provides insight
into the government’s response to the financial crisis.89
The following six TARP programs invested capital or guaranteed assets in return for equity in financial institutions:
1. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP) symbolized TARP
for the general public. Treasury announced that CPP would directly invest in “healthy, viable banks to promote financial stability, maintain confidence in the financial system, and permit
institutions to continue meeting the credit needs of American
consumers and businesses.”90
Over the life of the program Treasury purchased $205 billion in preferred stock and subordinated debentures from 707
different qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) in forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.91 The ten
largest investments accounted for $142.6 billion of the pro-

84. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 2, 122 Stat. 3765, 3766.
85. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: TWO YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 1 (2010) [hereinafter
TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/news/Documents/TARP%20Two%20Year%20Retrospective_10%2005%
2010_transmittal%20letter.pdf.
86. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 43.
87. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 37.
88. See id. at 37–43.
89. Because the focus of this Article is the financial crisis, the TARP programs pertaining to the automobile industry will not be discussed in any detail.
90. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-04, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 55 (2009)
[hereinafter SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2009], available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_
Congress.pdf.
91. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 70.

2011]

WHO BENEFITED FROM THE BAILOUT?

1581

gram.92 Three hundred thirty-one of the 707 recipients received
$10 million or less.93
Under CPP, Treasury received senior preferred shares that
pay a five percent dividend for the first five years and nine percent per year thereafter.94 In addition to the senior preferred
shares, each public QFI issued Treasury ten-year warrants
equal to approximately fifteen percent of the preferred stock
investment (five percent for nonpublic QFIs).95
As of September 30, 2010, 121 banks, including ten with
the largest CPP investments, had paid back all or a portion of
their principal or repurchased shares for an aggregate total of
$152.8 billion of repayments.96 The government also had received $8 billion as proceeds from the sale or repurchase of CPP
and TIP warrants and an additional $3 billion in proceeds from
the sale of Citigroup stock.97
As of September 1, 2010, 614 banks retained their CPP
funds, with $55.1 billion outstanding.98 At the end of that
month, there was $211.3 million in outstanding unpaid CPP
dividends.99
2. The Capital Assistance Program built upon CPP. Following the 2009 stress tests100 of the nineteen largest bank holding
companies, Treasury offered these banks the option of requesting additional capital investment or conversion of CPP preferred into mandatory convertible preferred shares.101
3. The Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (SSFI)
program was created to assist QFIs requiring exceptional assistance. AIG was the only recipient of funds under SSFI.102
4. The Targeted Investment Program (TIP) provided special
funding to Bank of America and Citigroup.103 It purchased $20
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 69.
95. Id.
96. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 92–93.
97. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 23.
98. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22.
99. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 13.
100. Stress tests are used by regulators to assess whether a bank has sufficient capital to withstand an adverse change in economic conditions. For a
more detailed discussion of the stress tests, see FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 14, at 32–34.
101. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 53–55.
102. Id. at 32.
103. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 29.
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billion of senior preferred stock and received warrants for
common stock from each bank.104 Both banks have repurchased
the stock.105
5. The Asset Guarantee Program (AGP) was similar to the
JPM/Bear loss insurance pool. The Treasury, Fed, and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) agreed jointly to provide
loss protection for a pool of Citigroup troubled assets worth
$301 billion.106 In exchange, Citigroup issued $7 billion in
trust-preferred securities and warrants to Treasury and the
FDIC.107 At the end of 2009, the insurance protection was cancelled and Treasury reduced its interest in the trust-preferred
securities to $2.2 billion.108
6. The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI)
funded organizations providing financial services to underserved communities.109 Eligible entities could obtain capital up
to five percent of their risk-weighted assets.110 The preferred
stock issued would pay an annual dividend of two percent for
eight years, increasing to nine percent thereafter.111 Through
CDCI, eighty-four institutions received a total of $570 million.112
Four other TARP programs focused on reviving the primary and secondary debt markets in asset-backed securities
(ABS):
1. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)
was designed to jumpstart the primary ABS market.113 The
N.Y. Fed provided three- or five-year nonrecourse loans to investors secured by certain types of ABSs, including newly issued and legacy commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).114
Initially a $200 billion loan facility (backed by $20 billion from
TARP), it was then expanded to up to $1 trillion of lending
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 30–31.
109. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 85.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 33. “Of this
amount, approximately $363.3 million from 28 banks was exchanged from investments under the Capital Purchase Program into the CDCI.” Id.
113. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 91.
114. Id. at 92.
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(backed by $80 billion from TARP).115 Ultimately, it supported
thirteen nonmortgage ABS deals totaling $59 billion and an
additional thirteen CMBS deals totaling $12.1 billion.116 Because of the dramatic collapse of these markets, these offerings
accounted for twenty-five percent of the ABS market and seventy-one percent of the CMBS market in 2009.117 The only
TARP funds lost, approximately $1 million, went to administration costs.118 In addition, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) “estimated the subsidy rate for Treasury protection for
the TALF to be 6 percent, resulting in a $1 billion loss in TARP
funds over the life of the program.”119
2. The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) was
created to restart frozen credit markets through the purchase
of legacy assets (e.g., legacy loans, CMBS, RMBS).120 Nine fund
managers were selected, eight of which remained as of July
2010.121 The Treasury, through TARP, agreed to make an equity investment equal to the private capital raised and then provide debt financing at LIBOR+1% equal to the total publicprivate equity investment.122 As of July 2010 the eight funds
had closed on a total of $22.1 billion (total allocated $30 billion)
in debt and equity financing from TARP.123 Treasury has reported rates of return for the eight funds ranging from nine to
twenty-six percent.124
3. The Unlocking Credit for Small Businesses (UCSB) program was created to restart the secondary market in securities
backed by Small Business Administration (SBA) loans.125 Initially, Treasury committed $15 billion in TARP funds (subsequently lowered to $1 billion and then lowered again to $400

115. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 72.
116. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 52.
117. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 49.
118. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 96.
119. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 23–24.
120. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 41.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 50 tbl.2.4, 100. The London interbank offering rate (LIBOR)
is a commonly used lending benchmark based on the interest rate for bank-tobank short-term lending.
123. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 23 (noting that
after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, Treasury reduced the $30 billion initial
allocation of TARP funds to the PPIP to $22.4 billion).
124. Id.
125. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 141.
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million in July 2010).126 Ultimately, Treasury made thirty-one
purchases totaling $357 million.127
4. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was
created to directly assist homeowners facing foreclosure by providing a method of renegotiating mortgages to affordable levels.128 The original goal was to assist three to four million
homeowners.129 During the great depression the Federal government created an analogous program, called the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). “Although the HOLC refinanced
approximately 20% of the nation’s mortgages, preventing many
foreclosures, its success was qualified. The agency rejected half
of the applications and set relatively stringent terms for borrowers. Nevertheless, 20% of its loans ended in default.”130
The July 2010 SIGTARP report was highly critical of the
program:
Despite a seemingly ever increasing array of HAMP-related initiatives designed to encourage participation in the program, the number
of homeowners being helped through permanent modifications remains anemic, with fewer than 400,000 ongoing permanent modifications (only approximately 165,000 of which are in connection with the
TARP-funded portion of HAMP) . . . .131

The report concluded that:
The American people are essentially being asked to shoulder an additional $50 billion of national debt without being told, more than 16
months after the program’s announcement, how many people Treasury hopes to actually help stay in their homes as a result of these expenditures, how many people are intended to be helped through other
subprograms, and how the program is performing against those expectations and goals.132

B. FOLLOWING THE REAL MONEY—NON-TARP FUNDING AND
GUARANTEES
While the public focused on the cost and impact of TARP,
in reality it was only one component of the government response to the financial crisis. When compared to other govern126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 54.
129. See id. at 56.
130. Learning from the Past: Lessons from The Banking Crises of the 20th
Century: Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 84 (2009)
(statement of Eugene N. White, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
senate_hearings&docid=f:48951.pdf.
131. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 6.
132. Id. at 7.
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ment loan guarantee programs and secondary market interventions, it was a small piece of a very large pie. The July 2010
SIGTARP report calculated the current outstanding balance of
overall federal support for the nation’s financial system at $3.7
trillion in actual expenditures and guarantees.133 Most of the
amount was assumed or spent without direct congressional action.134 Several agencies participated in the non-TARP bailout.
The following are the most significant of the agencies that participated:
1. The Federal Reserve Board established eighteen financial
support programs outside of TARP since 2007.135 Some programs provided short-term liquidity to banks and other financial institutions through secured transactions.136 Other programs provided liquidity to support the commercial paper
market, the money markets (and funds), and the ABS markets.137 The Fed also engaged in massive open market purchases to support all credit markets.138 The Fed authorized a maximum potential balance sheet expansion of approximately $6.7
trillion and, at its peak in May 2010, its balance sheet had
reached $2.4 trillion.139 As of July 2010 its balance sheet was
approximately $1.7 trillion, including $1.1 trillion in government sponsored entities (GSE) debt.140
The magnitude of Fed lending to financial institutions has
recently been made public, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank
Act.141 At its peak, the Fed lent $3.3 trillion to QFIs at interest
rates ranging from 0.5 percent to 3.25 percent.142
2. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) similarly authorized a potential balance sheet expansion up to $2.5
trillion.143 As of July 2010 its assets stood at $309.6 billion.144
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 5.
See id.
Id. at 120.
See id.
See id. at 120–21.
See id. at 121.
Id. at 118.
See id. at 122 tbl.3.2.
See Gretchen Morgenson, So That’s Where the Money Went, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at BU1, available at 2010 WLNR 24107629 (“The DoddFrank law forced the Fed to disclose the recipients of $3.3 trillion from emergency lending programs put in place during the crisis days of 2008, so the taxpayers who paid for those rescue efforts now know whom they were helping.”).
142. See id.
143. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 118.
144. See id. at 119, 141 tbl.3.4.
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3. The Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA)
had an implied commitment obligation of approximately $6 trillion for all outstanding GSE debt and MBS guarantees.145
4. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) made approximately $500 billion in additional guarantees from Federal Housing Administration and Government
National Mortgage Administration obligations over its precrisis commitments.146
5. The Department of Education purchased $99.6 billion in
educational student loans, as of June 30, 2010.147
6. The Department of the Treasury had an outstanding balance for non-TARP programs that increased from $257.1 billion
to $533.5 billion between July 2009 and July 2010.148 As of
June 30, 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had received
$83.6 billion and $61.3 billion, respectively, and the Treasury
held $180.7 billion in GSE MBS.149 Also, Treasury purchased
$15.3 billion in newly issued Fannie and Freddie debt obligations.150
In 2009 the SIGTARP testified that if all government efforts, including guarantees, were included, the theoretical government risk exposure would be an astounding $23.7 trillion,151
which is equal to roughly 150 percent of U.S. GDP.152 In his July 2010 report, he revised this figure upward to $23.9 trillion.153
Fortunately, this doomsday scenario did not, and will not, oc145. Id. at 119.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 140.
148. Id. at 119.
149. Id. at 137–38.
150. See id. at 136 tbl.3.3.
151. See Following the Money: Report of the Special Inspector General for
the Troubled Asset Relief Program [SIGTARP]: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg62118/pdf/CHRG
-111hhrg62118.pdf.
152. See News Release: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Corporate Profits, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/
gdpnewsrelease.htm (last modified Mar. 25, 2011).
153. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2010, supra note 24, at 116
(“[The m]aximum potential commitment related to crisis ($23.9 trillion)—each
program’s gross, not net, pledged commitment if all eligible applicants had requested the maximum assistance for each program at the same time. Implicit
guarantees are included in these figures. When a program has no limit, such
as Treasury’s commitment to backstop losses for the GSEs, the high-water
mark is used for this figure as well.”).
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cur. However, in the same report he indicated that the actual
high-water mark for government assistance and guarantees
was $6.3 trillion.154
C. ASSESSING TARP AND NON-TARP INTERVENTIONS
Assessing TARP and non-TARP assistance is difficult.
While many of the TARP programs have largely ended, some
such as PPIP and HAMP will continue on for years to come. In
some cases, particularly the non-TARP initiatives, too little is
still known. Not only is the size of many non-TARP efforts nonpublic, but also the final cost will not be ascertainable until the
securities purchased or guaranteed are sold. With these caveats, section 1 will examine the extent that TARP addressed
the goals of Congress included in the act. Section 2 will examine the costs, as they are known to date, of TARP programs.
Section 3 will look at the AIG intervention and discuss three
important problems in the implementation of this pre-TARP intervention.
1. Did TARP Accomplish Its Goals?
“TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil—that is, it
saved the American financial system from collapse—but it was
implemented in a way that was excessively favorable to the very
bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up
exactly the wrong incentives as we head into the next credit
cycle.”
—Simon Johnson, Professor of Global Economics and
Management, MIT Sloan School of Management.155
With the benefit of hindsight, one must conclude that
TARP was far less significant than envisioned. Both the
SIGTARP and the COP have questioned whether TARP had a
tangible impact on its nonbailout goals—stimulating the broad
economy and job growth, stemming the tidal wave of home foreclosures, protecting pensions and savings, and maximizing returns to investors.156 As discussed below in section 2, TARP
154. Id.
155. Simon Johnson, TARP, the Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX
(Sept. 30, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/tarp
-the-long-goodbye/.
156. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 88 (noting that
since the enactment of EESA, home values have fallen, foreclosures have increased, and investments for college and retirement have yet to recover their
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never came close to spending the full $700 billion that Congress
originally appropriated. In fact it now seems clear that the
open market activities of the Fed and the expanded guarantee
programs of the Fed, FDIC, HUD, and FHFA likely had a bigger impact.
While it did not achieve the lofty national goals stated, it
was foolish to think that it would. TARP was an emergency
program to halt a financial panic before it became a complete
financial collapse. In that respect, TARP and the larger nonTARP interventions worked. Our banking system is not completely sound. But it is also not on life support. Whether it is
more susceptible to larger financial crises in the future will be
discussed in Part III.
2. What Did TARP Cost the Government?
TARP did not cost the taxpayer as much as was feared.
The full $700 billion appropriated by Congress was never
spent. In fact, total spending under TARP was less than $400
billion and over $200 billion has been repaid, with interest and
in some cases a profit on the warrants issued.157 Currently, the
overall annual rate of return stands at 9.9 percent.158 In November 2010, the General Motors (GM) IPO further reduced
the total cost of TARP.159 Similarly, the government announced
that its sale of its remaining Citigroup stock would result in a
total government profit of $12 billion on funds provided to Citigroup.160 Eventually more will be repaid from the sale of the
value); SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2010, supra note 4, at 5–6
(noting that TARP has failed to increase lending, reduce unemployment, or
encourage modification of more than a fraction of home mortgages).
157. See TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at i, 14. As of
September 30, 2010, the government has earned $8.2 billion from the sale of
warrants received from banks under TARP. Id. at 13 fig.3-A.
158. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22 (“For CPP investments in financial institutions that have been fully repaid, including warrants repurchased or sold, the overall annual rate of return currently stands
at 9.9 percent.”).
159. In the GM IPO, the government sold 411 million shares (reducing its
ownership from sixty-one percent to thirty-three percent) and received $13.5
billion. Chris V. Nicholson, Treasury Nets Further $1.8 Billion from G.M.
I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 3, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2010/12/03/treasury-nets-further-1-8-billion-from-g-m-i-p-o/. “The automaker will buy back $2.1 billion in preferred stock from Treasury this month,
at which point the government will have recovered $23.1 billion in payments,
interest and dividends on its $49.5 billion rescue, it said.” Id.
160. Eric Dash, Treasury to Sell Last of Its Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/
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remainder of the government interest in GM,161 from the sale of
remaining AIG assets, and the eventual sale of AIG stock held
by the government.
In its September 2010 report, the COP found that 614
banks still held their CPP funds, with a total of $55.1 billion
outstanding.162 “As a result, it is not yet possible to calculate
precisely the amount of money that the CPP will earn or lose,
although any losses can be capped at $57.4 billion.”163 The direct financial cost to the federal government, however, will
probably be a fraction of that exposure, and the CPP program
may even produce a net gain.164
The performance of the original JPM/Bear troubled assets
pool, the Citigroup troubled assets pool, and the aforementioned PPIP pools all suggest that the government guarantee
program on these pools, when executed properly, was also successful. This suggests that the government will make a profit
on the PPIP pools.
The September 2010 COP report summarized TARP losses
in each program, as estimated by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), CBO, and Treasury.165 In each case, there
was agreement that the large losses for TARP will likely come
from the auto bailout, HAMP, and AIG.166 Although the HAMP
program could potentially cost $20 billion to $50 billion, if the
program continues to flounder it may not cost much.167 The auto bailout must be viewed separately from TARP. It may or
may not cost $25 billion to $34 billion.168 While the GM IPO
suggests a lower figure, it may be years before we know.
While the AIG intervention is still likely to lose $35 billion
to $50 billion, Treasury officials dispute this figure and believe
that the government commitment will ultimately be profitatreasury-to-sell-last-of-citi-stake/.
161. Michael J. de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of
G.M. Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR
22969625 (“To break even, the Treasury Department will need to sell its remaining 500 million shares at an average price of $53 each in the months and
years to come.”).
162. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 108–09 (“The CBO also estimates that the financial institution
bailout component of TARP—the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)—will return a profit of approximately $2 billion.”).
165. See id. at 20 fig.1.
166. See id.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 131–32.
168. See COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 20 fig.1.
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ble.169 However, one must recognize that much of the total cost
of the AIG intervention could have been avoided, or reduced, if
government officials had acted prudently (in negotiating the
original terms of the AIG loan and in monitoring AIG bonuses),
had insisted on shared sacrifice from CDS counterparties in its
negotiations, and had not used AIG as a disguised funding conduit to other institutions.170
Finally, in determining the true cost of TARP, one must
consider a variety of “hidden” costs. For example, an earlier
SIGTARP report identified another TARP cost that has been
overlooked.171 Because all of the money allocated to TARP had
to be borrowed by the U.S. government, one must include the
borrowing cost of these funds into the total cost of the TARP
program.172 As of September 30, 2009, Treasury estimates that
the dollar-weighted average cost of TARP funding was below
0.9 percent for a total interest cost of $2.3 billion.173 The
SIGTARP disputed this figure. Using an average blended cost
of Treasury funds, it determined the borrowing cost as at least
twice this amount, and an “all-in” estimate (carrying costs over
the life of the borrowings) would yield an amount three to four
times the $2.3 billion estimate.174
In its September 2010 report, the COP noted that in June
2009 the CBO estimated that TARP would cost $159 billion,
and in August 2009 the OMB projected that TARP would cost
$341 billion.175 In its FY 2011 budget estimate, OMB lowered
its projections to $116.8 billion and the CBO estimate was lowered to $109 billion and then to $66 billion.176 In its retrospective report, the Treasury has projected a final TARP cost of $51
billion (including the auto bailout).177 With the success of the
GM IPO, the sale of AIG foreign subsidiaries, a future AIG government stock sale, and if the HAMP program continues to be
169. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Breaking Even on A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 19736647.
170. See infra Part II.C.3.
171. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, October 2009, supra note 90, at 39.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 17 n.64.
176. Id. at 17.
177. TREASURY RETROSPECTIVE REPORT, supra note 85, at 4 fig.2-B. The
Treasury estimate assumes that government-owned AIG stock will be sold for
$97 billion. It also assumes that the HAMP program will cost $46 billion, notwithstanding its limited ability to spend any money. Id.
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unsuccessful, it is conceivable that the final cost to the taxpayer will be close to zero.
The true costs of the secondary-market interventions and
guarantees provided by the Fed and other agencies cannot be
predicted at this time. In fact, it may be years before even a
rough calculation is possible. Only the Fed knows the quality of
the securities it bought and the guarantees it provided.178 Since
the prices paid by the Fed were intentionally designed to provide market stability, one should assume that the prices were
higher than the prevailing market prices, but below the intrinsic value of the securities in a recovering market. Whether the
long-term prices will be higher is unknowable.
3. What Went Wrong?
Any analysis of the AIG bailout should not begin with a
judgment on the choice between addressing moral-hazard risk
or systemic risk. The market panic and collapse following Lehman made it imperative that the government intervene. Instead, the focus should be on the mechanics of the intervention
and how to minimize the cost and consequences of it. The following three sections describe mistakes that were made in AIG,
namely (a) the myth of the binary choice, (b) the government’s
failure to negotiate effectively or choice not to negotiate, and (c)
the high costs of backdoor bailouts.
a. Myth of the Binary Choice
On any number of occasions, Chairman Bernanke, Secretary Paulson, and Secretary Geithner have stated that the decision on AIG was a binary choice—a full government bailout or
a full collapse that would have resulted in a cataclysmic systemic failure.179 This Article disagrees with that position and
posits that the history of recent financial failures demonstrates
that this was not a binary choice. In many prior financial failures (for example, Salomon Brothers, Long-Term Capital Management, Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia),
the government obtained private-sector participation. While officials consistently argue that no private-sector alternative was
possible, it is hard to fathom why. For example, it was possible
178. As discussed previously, Dodd-Frank required the Fed to disclose its
emergency lending programs, but did not require the Fed to disclose the purchase price of securities bought in the secondary market. See supra text accompanying note 141.
179. See, e.g., COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 196–97.
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for regulators to persuade the private sector to participate in
the Long-Term Capital Management bailout,180 but not in a
resolution of AIG, a company with a demonstrably robust organic business! One must speculate whether no private option
for AIG existed because all private suitors understood that the
government would take action. The COP rejected the binarychoice rationale:
The government argues that AIG’s failure would have resulted in
chaos, so that a wholesale rescue was the only viable choice. The Panel rejects this all-or-nothing reasoning. The government had additional options at its disposal leading into the crisis, although those options narrowed sharply in the final hours before it committed $85
billion in taxpayer dollars.181

The COP report acknowledges the difficulty in obtaining a
private-sector solution in the short time available and given the
state of panic in the markets.182 However, it identifies two important benefits of a private resolution:
First, it would have saved billions of taxpayer dollars and mitigated if
not eliminated the serious moral hazard and “too big to fail” concerns.
Second, a successful private sector rescue would have served as a very
strong and calming signal that the U.S. financial system was strong
enough to function without a full government bailout. The Panel also
notes that had private parties been involved they—and not the government—could have managed much of the post-bailout reorganization of the company.183

b. The Government Failed to Negotiate Effectively or Chose Not
to Negotiate
In the JPM/Bear acquisition, the government actively negotiated and insisted on a low share purchase price to send a
message.184 In the GM and Chrysler bailouts, government negotiators worked for weeks to obtain concessions from creditors,
investors, auto suppliers, and auto dealers.185 In contrast, the
entire AIG program was literally constructed overnight by exhausted government officials who panicked after the market
reaction to Lehman. It accepted an AIG proposal that the pri-

180. See FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that Long-Term
Capital Management was a massive, high-profile hedge fund that became insolvent in 1998 due to losses of more than $4 billion).
181. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 118.
184. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 37.
185. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 120 & n.556.
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vate sector rejected, and further agreed to provide AIG with an
additional $10 billion.186
It refused to insist upon shared sacrifice by unsecured
creditors and, in fact, through ML III, it agreed to pay $1.00 for
$0.66 of securities,187 expressly deciding not to negotiate a better deal or use its leverage as regulator to demand concessions.188 As the COP concluded:
The rescue of AIG distorted the marketplace by transforming highly
risky derivative bets into fully guaranteed payment obligations. In
the ordinary course of business, the costs of AIG’s inability to meet its
derivative obligations would have been borne entirely by AIG’s shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of bankruptcy.
But . . . the government instead shifted those costs in full onto taxpayers . . . . [T]he government backed up the entire derivatives market, as if these trades deserved the same taxpayer backstop as savings deposits and checking accounts.189

SIGTARP Barofsky testified before Congress that “Federal
Reserve officials provided AIG’s counterparties with tens of billions of dollars they likely would have not otherwise received
had AIG gone into bankruptcy.”190
The government’s disinterest in negotiating in the best interests of the taxpayer did not end with ML III. Subsequently,
the government permitted AIG to pay $168 million in compensation bonuses and tried to hide the fact.191 While it was argued
that these bonuses were contractual obligations, one should
remember that the contracts would have been subject to renegotiation in bankruptcy.192
c. High Costs of Backdoor Bailouts
There is a widespread perception that the decision to bailout AIG without demanding concessions was designed to save
its counterparties, such as Goldman Sachs.193 While this per186. See id. at 57.
187. Warren Testimony, supra note 65, at 3.
188. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010, supra note 52, at 9.
189. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
190. Barofsky statement, supra note 78, at 10.
191. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010, supra note 52, at
8–9 (“Treasury officials effectively outsourced oversight of AIG’s compensation
systems to the Federal Reserve, failing to take any independent steps to assess broadly the amount or scope of AIG’s compensation obligations . . . . As a
result, senior Treasury officials were apparently not aware of the details of the
March 2009 AIGFP payments until February 28, 2009.”).
192. See COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 103.
193. See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 169; SORKIN, supra note
1, at 532–33.
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ception may never be confirmed, it is interesting that Goldman
received more money through ML III, $12.9 billion,194 than it
received through the TARP CPP program, $10 billion.195 Shortly after receiving the money via ML III, the firm repaid its CPP
loan.196 In doing so, it escaped the TARP restrictions on compensation.
Similarly, COP pointed out that the government conservatorship of the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (estimated to
cost $389 billion) provided another backdoor subsidy, possibly
as much as $100 billion, to financial institutions.197
III. WAS THIS CRISIS—OR THE GOVERNMENT’S
RESPONSE—REALLY DIFFERENT?
The financial crisis and the government’s response must be
examined in the context of past financial crises. Section A of
this Part will briefly describe six discrete financial failures that
occurred during the past four decades and highlight a remarkably consistent pattern both in the banking failures and in
their governmental responses. Section B will discuss how the
business model of banking has changed while the regulatory
oversight model has failed to keep pace with these changes.
The significant and steady trend of consolidation in the financial sector will also be discussed. Finally, section C will consider what can be learned from this and past financial crises, what
to expect when future crises inevitably occur, and several regulatory changes that have been adopted or should be considered.
A. PAST BANKING FAILURES
The Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) staff issued
a study of bank failures and government interventions.198 A
short review of several notable examples reveals a familiar and
recurring pattern.

194. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 169.
195. COP JUNE 2010 REPORT, supra note 50, at 90 n.420.
196. See SORKIN, supra note 1, at 533 (noting that Goldman paid $1.1 billion to repurchase its warrants).
197. COP SEPTEMBER 2010 REPORT, supra note 74, at 108 (“If only 25 percent of the CBO cost of the bailouts ultimately inures to the benefit of TARP
recipients and other financial institutions, Treasury will have provided a subsidy to these institutions of approximately $100 billion. This non-TARP government sponsored support—unlike obligations incurred under the TARP itself—remains cost-free to the recipients.” (footnotes omitted)).
198. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14.

2011]

WHO BENEFITED FROM THE BAILOUT?

1595

1. Franklin National Bank failed in 1974. An obscure bank
on Long Island, New York, it tripled in size in eleven years.199
It financed its aggressive lending, largely in commercial real
estate and mysterious foreign loans, by aggressively seeking
wholesale deposits, often from foreign depositors, at abovemarket interest rates.200 These loans were not federally insured. When it experienced a sudden series of loan failures,
large amounts of the wholesale deposits were withdrawn, causing it to fail. When the bank failed, the FDIC covered all uninsured depositors and creditors.201 At the time it was the largest
U.S. bank bailout since the Great Depression.202
2. First Pennsylvania Bank failed in 1980. One of the oldest
and largest banks in the state, it pursued an aggressive lending
strategy for a decade.203 The bank quadrupled in size in thirteen years, fueled by uninsured wholesale deposits.204 Because
Pennsylvania banking law prohibited an out-of-state bank from
acquiring it, and no geographically proximate in-state bank
was large enough, the FDIC provided a $325 million interestfree loan (and received warrants for a majority of bank stock)
and assumed control until the bank could be liquidated.205
3. Continental Illinois Bank failed in 1984. Once again, a
bank pursued a high-growth strategy of high-risk lending in
energy, real estate, and foreign sovereign debt (doubling in size
in five years), fueled by uninsured wholesale deposits and
short-term borrowing.206 At the time of failure, $27 billion out
of $30 billion in deposits were uninsured.207 When the bank
failed, no merger partner was available because of state-law
prohibitions on branch banking. In exchange for stock and warrants representing an eighty percent interest in the company,
the FDIC provided $4.5 billion and covered all uninsured depositors and creditors.208 The phrase “too big to fail” was used

199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 5.
See id.
Id.
MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY: THE COLLAPSE
OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 29–30 (1990).
203. See FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 6.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 7.
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for the first time at congressional hearings on Continental Illinois.209
4. The Bank of New England failed in 1991. Once again,
this bank doubled in size in four years, primarily through lending in the commercial real estate and construction market.210
When the bank failed, the FDIC covered all bank creditors, but
did not cover holding company bondholders or affiliated
banks.211 The resolution costs totaled $733 million.212
5. The national banking crisis of the 1980s. During the period from 1980 to 1994, more than 1600 banks failed at a cost of
$36 billion to the FDIC, and more than 1300 savings and loan
banks failed, costing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) $28 billion and taxpayers $132 billion.213
6. The Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers failures in 2008
followed the same pattern. Bear Stearns’s assets grew from
$185 billion to $400 billion during the years 2003 to 2008.214
Similarly, Lehman’s assets grew from $354 billion to $814 billion during the years 2003 to 2007.215 Both firms fueled this
growth through short-term borrowing, largely in the repo market.
This brief summary of past financial failures demonstrates
a recurring pattern of events. A financial institution dramatically increases its lending capacity by obtaining high-cost
wholesale demand deposits or short-term borrowing from other
financial institutions (such as the overnight repo market).
These short-term funds are used to finance a business strategy
focused on longer-term, high-risk lending. When a portion of
these loans default, due to poor lending practices or the collapse of a market bubble, the wholesale deposits are withdrawn, the short-term lenders refuse to continue lending, and
the bank becomes insolvent. Inevitably, the financial regulator
must intervene. If possible, the regulator orchestrates a private-sector takeover of the failed institution, frequently involv209. See id. at 7–8.
210. See 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Banking Problems in the Northeast, in
HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S, at 337, 373–74 (1997)
[hereinafter HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/history/vol1.html.
211. See id. at 375–76.
212. Id. at 372.
213. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.
214. Id. at 21.
215. Id. at 24.
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ing federal assumption of troubled assets. In each of these respects, the crisis of 2008 was no different.
B. WHILE THE CRISIS WAS NOT DIFFERENT, THE BUSINESS OF
BANKING IS
Notwithstanding the repetitive pattern in financial crises,
the business model of banking has changed during the last
three decades. Section 1 will describe the most significant
changes arising from a combination of financial innovation,
such as securitization, and deregulatory actions designed to
permit banks to engage in a wider array of business sectors. It
will also describe how the traditional model of banking regulation did not change sufficiently to keep pace with the banks
under regulation. Section 2 will briefly describe the substantial
consolidation in the banking industry that occurred during this
same period of time.
1. The Banking Business Model Changed Fundamentally in
Three Decades, but the Model for Regulatory Oversight Did
Not Keep Pace
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression, Congress enacted the Banking Act of
1933 (commonly referred to as Glass-Steagall after its two
principal sponsors).216 The law dramatically reformed the
structure of banking in the United States and created a national system of regulation. For the first time, the government provided a safety net for the general public when it established a
national government insurance program for all bank deposits.217 In doing so, it acted as a prudent insurer. Glass-Steagall
limited the amount of insurance available on each account, it
empowered the Fed to set limits on the interest rate that banks
could pay on insured bank deposits, and, most importantly, it
limited what banks could do with these insured funds.218 GlassSteagall required commercial banks to eliminate or sell off investment banking and brokerage divisions.219 This prevented
banks from using government-insured deposits to engage in
216. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)) (repealed in part 1999).
217. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 34 –35.
218. See id. at 35.
219. See id. at 34 (noting that, for example, the famed “House of Morgan”
was split into two unrelated entities, a commercial bank named J.P. Morgan
and an investment bank and broker named Morgan Stanley).
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high-risk business (other than risky loans).220 Notwithstanding
limited failures, this model worked.221 In this highly regulated
system, banks were the dominant provider of lending intermediation.222 By regulating the maximum interest rate on savings
accounts, it created a business model for banks that virtually
guaranteed profitability.223 It also created a system in which
bank (including savings and loan banks) failures were rare.224
This business model no longer exists. It began to crumble
in 1980 when the combination of high inflation and competition
from money market funds (which could pay much higher market rates) caused the Fed to rescind Regulation Q, which set
savings account interest rates.225 The growth of money market
funds, which invested in short-term government debt and private commercial paper, created a huge demand for corporate
commercial paper.226 Companies could access this market for
short-term operating cash, instead of relying upon banks to
provide revolving lines of credit.227 SEC regulation 415 (shelf
regulation), in 1984, reduced the time required for, and cost of,
corporate debt offerings and siphoned off longer-term bank
lending to companies.228 The use of junk bonds to finance mergers and acquisitions and to finance long-term borrowing by
noninvestment grade companies diminished another profitable
banking segment.229 The enormous growth in asset-backed se220. ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE
OF OUR POLITICS UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 90 (2007).
221. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 35.
222. See id.
223. Has anyone ever heard of the 4 -5-3 principle? During the era of government-set regulations on interest rates for deposits, it was said that the successful bank operated on the principle of paying four percent on savings deposits, charging five percent on loans, and playing golf with clients by 3:00 pm.
Johnson and Kwak describe the principle as the “3-6-3 rule.” Id.
224. MAYER, supra note 202, at 35 (noting that from 1934 –1981, the FSLIC
suffered total losses of $630 million).
225. KUTTNER, supra note 220, at 102.
226. See Money Market Fund Reform, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688–89 (proposed
June 30, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
227. See id. (“Today, money market funds provide a substantial portion of
short-term credit extended to U.S. businesses.”).
228. Rule 415, Securities Act Release No. 6499 [1982–1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,449 (Dec. 31, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.415); see also FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND
RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 44 (2003) (stating that shelf regulations allowed companies to “issue new stocks or bonds much more quickly
and at lower cost”).
229. Cf. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 75–76 (noting the shift in corporate financing patterns that occurred with the explosive growth of junk bonds).
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curitization—first residential mortgages, followed by commercial mortgages, followed by car and consumer loans, followed by
credit card receivables—changed banks from the ultimate lender, with the risk of loan default, into an intermediary who derived profits from loan origination fees, securitizationunderwriting fees, and loan-servicing fees. In the “originate to
distribute” business model, banks had no risk from making
poor quality loans.230 In fact, the converse was true. The riskier
loans generated higher fees and were more profitable.231 Similarly, small businesses reduced their reliance on bank loans,
using alternative financing sources such as credit cards and
home equity lines on residences.232
Competition from capital markets fundamentally altered
the traditional banking business model. In response to these
fundamental changes, the banking regulators, over a thirtyyear period, administratively eased or eliminated the GlassSteagall prohibitions on riskier bank lending.233 During the
1980s, the Fed, through its broad exemptive authority, permitted banks, in short succession, to own retail brokerage subsidiaries; to own and trade in a holding company proprietary account any form of equity, debt, or derivative security; to
underwrite municipal securities; and to underwrite corporate
securities.234 In 1998 when the Fed gave Citibank a two-year
exemption from Glass-Steagall in order to complete its merger
with Travelers Insurance, it made Glass-Steagall repeal a formality.235 Congressional repeal in 1999236 was the equivalent of
placing a tombstone on the grave that had been dug and closed
during the preceding two decades.
While one could argue that banking deregulation was driven by philosophy, a more persuasive argument can be made
that it reflected the enormous changes in financial intermediation that occurred. Simply put, banks could no longer rely on
230. Id. at 77.
231. See id. at 76.
232. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT: REVIVING
LENDING TO SMALL BUSINESSES AND FAMILIES AND THE IMPACT OF THE TALF
8 (2009).
233. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Financial Regulation: Past and Future, Speech at the Money Marketers
of New York University (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/tarullo20091109a.htm.
234. See PARTNOY, supra note 228, at 47.
235. See KUTTNER, supra note 220, at 104.
236. See id. at 104 –05.
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traditional lending practices for profitability. Competition from
capital markets and securitization was too great. Increasingly
large banks have relied upon transactional business—
investment banking, proprietary trading, mortgage and loan
origination fees, processing fees, and payment systems for profits.237 In 1987 Willard Butcher, chairman of Chase Manhattan
Bank, explained, “When I started in the bank 42 years ago 90
percent of our business came from loans to U.S. corporations.
Today, they account for less than 4 percent of income.”238 Twenty years later, one must wonder if the figure has declined further.
Not surprisingly, the largest banks are no longer primarily
lenders. They are financial intermediaries that generate revenue and profits from loan origination and servicing, securitization, investment banking, management of investment portfolios, traders of government securities and foreign currencies
and as the dominant participants in the OTC derivatives market.
The banks’ role in the derivatives market, and its impact
on the financial crisis, warrants particular attention. During
the 1990s the federal financial regulators decided to forbear direct regulation of this newly emerging business sector.239 Congress codified this regulatory forbearance in 2000.240 By 2009
the top five banks controlled over ninety-five percent of all derivatives contracts.241
The impact of bank participation in the OTC derivatives
market can best be understood by considering one form of derivative, the CDS. While subprime lending is frequently identified as the bottom-line cause of the financial crisis, in fact,
CDSs were the accelerant that caused the fire to envelop the
entire system.242 Credit default swaps are a derivative that is
237. See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE:
THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 53–54 (2010) (“In the early
1980s, J.P. Morgan earned most of its money by making commercial loans. By
1993, nearly 75 percent of its revenues derived from investment banking fees
and trading profits, the results of the bank moving to what one British journalist described as ‘new forms of finance.’ The most important of these new
forms was derivatives. By 1994, the year [then-J.P. Morgan CEO] Weatherstone retired, Fortune could quote a bank executive calling them ‘the basic
business of banking.’”).
238. KUTTNER, supra note 220, at 104.
239. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 134 –36.
240. See id. at 136–37.
241. Id. at 180.
242. Cf. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPORT, supra note 15,
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marketed as insurance against a loss due to a default by the issuer of a security.243 However, while insurance products may
only be sold to persons with an “insurable interest,” a demonstrable loss that the insurance policy will cover, anyone may
purchase a CDS.244 An insurance company is limited to writing
only the amount of insurance for which it has sufficient reserves to cover estimated probabilities of loss.245 A company
writing a CDS is not similarly limited.246 Because a CDS is a
contract, it is backed only by the financial balance sheet of the
issuer and the amount of collateral negotiated by the purchaser.247 When it collapsed, AIG had open CDS positions with a
notional value of $2.7 trillion dollars ($1 trillion was concentrated with twelve counterparties).248 At its peak, the CDS
market was worth roughly $60 trillion, ten times the face value
of the securities insured.249 When the benefits of a default are
ten times greater than the value of the default, it is an invitation for disaster.
The expansion of banks into these more aggressive and
riskier business segments may reflect a strategic plan of aggressive growth. But it also may reflect the declining profitability of the traditional banking model due to the growth of securitization and competition from nonbanks.
Although the bank business model changed fundamentally,
the regulatory system did not. Banking regulators continued to
focus on traditional responsibilities of bank minimum capital
requirements and the loan portfolio on the bank’s balance
sheet. Highly concentrated loan portfolios to be used for future
securitizations were not consolidated. The nonbank mortgage
origination process was unregulated, as was the OTC derivatives market. In a 2009 speech, Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo
acknowledged the regulatory failure to adequately oversee
at 40–41 (highlighting the risk posed by the potential failure of a CDS-issuing
firm).
243. Id. at 40.
244. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, July 2009, supra note 25, at 63.
245. Cf. Wallison, supra note 45, at 5 (identifying strategies for ensuring
the sufficiency of reserves).
246. See id. at 3–4.
247. See id.
248. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 202.
249. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: CREDIT
DERIVATIVES AND MORTGAGE-RELATED CREDIT DERIVATIVES 4 (2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0630-psr
-credit-derivatives.pdf.
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these new and important business segments: “Truthfully,
though, there was no wholesale transformation of financial
regulation to match the dramatic changes in the structure and
activities of the financial industry.”250
2. The U.S. Banking Sector Has Experienced an
Extraordinary Consolidation in Three Decades—the Implicit
Government Protection of “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Provides an
Important Competitive and Financial Advantage
For three decades, banking in the United States has become more concentrated, with a small number of the largest
banks increasingly dominating the industry. In 1984 only
twenty-four commercial banks had more than $10 billion in assets.251 Ten years later, in 1994, the number was sixty-four.252
During that period, total assets at these banks had risen from
$865 billion to $1.94 trillion.253
Not surprisingly, between 1990 and 2005 there were seventy-four bank mega-mergers (the acquiring and acquired banks
both held more than $10 billion in assets).254 During this period, the combined share of banking industry assets of the ten
largest banks grew from twenty-five percent to fifty-five percent.255 Between 1998 and 2007, the five largest U.S. banks—
Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, and
Wells Fargo—all made acquisitions and their combined assets
more than tripled (from $2.2 trillion to $6.8 trillion).256
This trend continues. Between 2007 and 2009 Bank of
America grew thirty percent to $2.3 trillion, JPM grew twentyfive percent to $2.0 trillion, and Wells Fargo doubled in size to
$1.2 trillion.257 In 1995, the combined assets of the six largest
banks equaled less than twenty percent of U.S. GDP.258 In
2009, the combined assets of the six largest banks was greater
than sixty percent of GDP.259 In 1994, the Fed adopted a regulation prohibiting any bank from having ten percent of all na250. Tarullo, supra note 233.
251. 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Continental Illinois and “Too Big to Fail,”
in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra note 210, at 235, 235 n.2.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 14.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 180.
258. Id. at 203 fig.7-1.
259. Id.
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tional retail deposits.260 In 2010 the three largest banks each
controlled more than ten percent of all retail deposits.261 All
three obtained waivers from the Fed.262
The investment banking firms grew in the same way. Between 1997 and 2007, Goldman Sachs assets grew from $178
billion to $1.1 trillion and Morgan Stanley grew from $302 billion to more than $1 trillion.263 The comparable growth by Bear
Stearns and Lehman has already been discussed.264
The reason for this dramatic consolidation is not because
larger banks are better banks. Simon Johnson and James
Kwak highlight a 2007 study coauthored by Roger Ferguson
(former Vice Chairman of the Fed) that “found that the unprecedented consolidation in the financial sector over the previous
decade had led to no significant efficiency gains, no economies
of scale beyond a low threshold, and no evident economies of
scope.”265
It appears that the real reason for banking consolidation is
the greater profitability of too-big-to-fail banks due to implicit
government protection. A recent academic study concluded that
the belief in an implicit government guarantee of the largest
banks dramatically reduces the cost of capital for the largest
banks. This study concluded that today the eighteen largest
banks borrow at rates 0.78 percent lower than smaller
banks.266 During the period from 2000 to 2007, the spread was
0.29 percent.267 This study calculated that this lower cost of
capital was worth up to $34 billion for the eighteen largest
banks in 2009, roughly half of their reported profits.268 The
FCIC Staff report describes a study by the Bank of England
that reached the same conclusion. “The study estimated that
the 26 global banks received an implicit subsidy of $37 billion
in 2007—of which $18 billion accrued to the five largest
banks—in the form of reduced funding costs due to lower [in260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 214.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
See supra Part I.A–B.
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 212 (quoting ROGER W.
FERGUSON, JR. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 93–94 (2007)).
266. See id. at 180–81.
267. Id. at 180.
268. See Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail”
Big Bank Subsidy, CENTER ECON. & POL’Y RES., 4 tbl.1 (Sept. 2009), http://
www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf.
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terest] rates paid on bonds and other ratings-sensitive wholesale liabilities.”269
There is additional evidence that the lower lending costs
for the largest banks are based upon the implicit government
subsidy rather than lower likelihood of failure. The history of
bank failures in this country demonstrates that the largest
banks have a greater risk of failure at a greater cost. “For example, although only 1 percent of failed institutions from 1986
to 1994 had more than $5 billion in assets, those banks made
up 37 percent of the total assets of failed institutions and accounted for 23 percent of [Bank Insurance Fund] losses during
that period.”270 Is it surprising that banks see major benefits in
growth for growth’s sake?
C. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM FOUR DECADES OF BANK
FAILURES? WHAT HAVE WE DONE?
The financial failures discussed in section A demonstrate a
common pattern in financial failures. The substantial changes
in the business of banking and in the consolidation of the industry described in section B provide insight into the increasing size and complexity of these failures. Section C will consider what can be learned from these events, what to expect when
future crises inevitably occur, and several regulatory changes
that have been adopted or should be considered.
1. Financial Crises Are Not Unforeseeable “Black Swans”—
When Banks Aggressively Grow Their Balance Sheets and Fuel
Them with “Hot Money”—They Are Candidates for Failure
“I would be the first to acknowledge that some things have
changed in our financial markets, but financial crises continue
to occur for the same reasons as always—over-optimism, excessive debt and leverage ratios, and misguided incentives and
perspectives—and our solutions must continue to address these
basic problems.”
—Thomas Hoenig, President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City271

269. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 12.
270. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 251, at 235.
271. Thomas M. Hoenig, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Kan. City, Speech in Omaha, Nebraska: Too Big Has Failed 9–10 (Mar.
6, 2009), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/
Omaha.03.06.09.pdf.
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The summary of major bank failures is remarkably consistent. A bank achieves dramatic growth in its business and balance in a short period of time. It makes large, high-risk loans
that promise high returns. The loans are supported by large
wholesale deposits, obtained by offering above-market interest
rates or by borrowing money on a short-term basis, often from
other financial institutions. In both cases, the source of funds
can disappear overnight if depositors make withdrawals or
lenders refuse to extend or “roll over” loans. This is “hot money.” Inevitably, high-risk loans fail at a greater rate than conservative loans and the hot money is gone when trouble appears. Similarly, when a bank relies upon aggressive leverage
to fuel lending growth, a series of loan failures or large trading
losses will effectively wipe out the capital cushion. In both cases, a bank failure ensues.
The series of failures previously discussed focused on
banks. An expanded list of financial failures would have included Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990,272 Baring Brothers in
1995,273 and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.274 One
might also add to this list the series of sovereign debt crises:
the Latin debt crisis of the early 1980s,275 Mexico in 1994,276
the Asian debt crisis in 1997,277 Russia in 1998,278 and Iceland,
Ireland, Greece, and Portugal during the most recent crisis.279
The frequency and variety of these failures over the past
three decades demonstrates that financial crises are not “black
swans” or “long tails.”280 They are not once in a generation
events that cannot be foreseen. Accordingly, regulatory policy
272. See FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 18–19.
273. See PARTNOY, supra note 228, at 243.
274. See FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 20.
275. See 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., The Banking Crises of the 1980s and
Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra
note 210, at 3, 43–44.
276. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 39.
277. See id. at 43.
278. See id. at 47.
279. See Stephen Castle, Economic Divisions in Euro Zone Are Seen as
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 23766032.
280. See Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the U.S. President’s Econ. Recovery
Advisory Bd. & Former Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago: Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference (Sept. 23, 2010), http://insider.thomsonreuters.com/link.html?ctype=
groupchannel&chid=3&cid=146696&shareToken=Mzo5NTI2NzE2ZS1kYTU5LT
Q0ZGQtYjU0Ny1mOTIyZDdmNDdhYmQ%3D (arguing that market crises
cannot be viewed as being normally distributed).
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must seriously monitor banks that exhibit unusually rapid
business and balance-sheet growth.
Because the pattern of aggressive expansion through risky
lending leading to bank failure appears so strong, one must ask
the question—why do some bank executives choose high-risk
strategies? While not the entire answer, the linkage between
stock-performance-based executive compensation and bank
growth must be considered. In 2009 congressional testimony,
Professor Simon Johnson discussed the dramatic rise in bank
compensation: “From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in
the financial sector varied between 99% and 108% of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward in nearly a straight line, reaching 181% in 2007.”281 Johnson and Kwak highlight the rise in compensation for CEOs of
the largest banks and investment houses over two decades. In
1985, the annual compensation of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon (at the time the most prominent firm on Wall Street) was
$5.8 million (inflation adjusted to 2009 dollars).282 In 2007
Lloyd Blankfein (Goldman Sachs) received $54 million, Jamie
Dimon (JPMorgan) received $34 million, John Thain (Merrill
Lynch) received $84 million, and John Mack (Morgan Stanley)
received $41 million.283 While the payment of large bonuses
and compensation packages was suspended following the financial crisis and the enactment of TARP, it proved to be fleeting.
The SIGTARP report of January 2010 stated that “although
there have been some improvements in the form that bonus
compensation takes for some executives, there has been little
fundamental change in the excessive compensation culture on
Wall Street.”284
Absent fundamental changes in the business of banking or
in the system for compensating persons who determine bank
business strategies, one must conclude that there will be financial crises in the future.

281. Systematic Risk: Are Some Institutions Too Big to Fail and If So, What
Should We Do About It? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th
Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/
simon_johnson.pdf.
282. See JOHNSON AND KWAK, supra note 2, at 57–59.
283. Id. at 59.
284. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010, supra note 52, at 6.
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2. In a Crisis, a Regulator Will Invariably Act to Prevent a
Systemic Failure, Even if It Exacerbates the Problem of Moral
Hazard
“It is a fantastical notion to expect that having once pulled
poorly run, systemically threatened firms out of the fire, government won’t do it again, no matter how many times and how
loudly it says it won’t.”
—Richard Fisher, President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas285
Notwithstanding the isolated case of Lehman (a decision
likely based upon the outcry over Bear Stearns), moral hazard
is a concern that rarely determines regulatory decisions. However, it continues to have a powerful effect on Congress. In
1991, Congress attempted to restrict similarly regulators’ ability to bail out the uninsured creditors and depositors.286 The
least-cost resolution provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) “barred
the FDIC from approving any transaction that would protect
uninsured depositors or other uninsured creditors in a failed
bank unless that transaction represented the least costly resolution option available to the FDIC.”287 However, the systemic
risk exemption “permits the FDIC to protect uninsured depositors or other uninsured creditors of a failing bank if such protection would avoid or mitigate ‘serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.’”288 Similarly, section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act permits the Fed to authorize a
Reserve Bank to lend in “unusual and exigent” circumstances.289 As discussed, non-TARP intervention by the Fed
likely had a far greater impact on stopping the financial panic
and ameliorating its consequences than the congressionally approved TARP intervention.290 Once again, in the Dodd-Frank
Act, Congress has attempted to restrict regulators’ discretion to
intervene by imposing limits on the ability of the FDIC to en-

285. Fisher, supra note 48, at 330.
286. Cf. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 275, at 51 (describing statutory limits on regulatory forbearance).
287. FCIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
288. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2006)).
289. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A) (2006).
290. See supra Part II.B.
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gage in bailouts of uninsured creditors.291 It remains to be seen
whether this will have the full desired effect.
Because regulators typically seem to find a way to take any
action they deem necessary to stem a financial crisis, the discussion of regulatory intervention policy should focus on how
the intervention occurs rather than if it should occur. In particular, attention should focus on the types of intervention and
the consequences of government intervention. Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s President Thomas Hoenig recommends
this approach. Under his approach, regulators would be required to place insolvent institutions in receivership, fire management, and engage in an orderly transfer or disposition of assets.292 “Too large” banks would be dismantled and sold off in
parts.293 Shareholders and unsecured creditors (including uninsured depositors) would be treated just as they would under the
bankruptcy code.294 The TARP strategy of providing federal
funds and allowing existing management to stay in place, subject to government micromanagement and “strings attached,”
would be prohibited.295
The lessons of the financial crisis for government seem
clear. Insolvent banks should be put into some form of receivership, with a rapid and orderly disposition of assets. Management should always be removed. There should be equally
shared sacrifice by all creditors, even those deemed systemically significant. The terms of the government’s contribution
should be more, not less, onerous than a private sector intervention.296

291. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 210, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010).
292. See Hoenig, supra note 271, at 11–12.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. As described previously, the government bailout of AIG was more favorable to AIG than the term sheet bailout rejected by the private sector. See
supra Part I.C. Numerous commentators have pointed out that Warren Buffett purchased preferred stock in Goldman Sachs on better terms than the
Treasury received through the CPP portion of TARP. See, e.g., Andrew A.
Samwick, Moral Hazard in Response to the 2008 Financial Market Meltdown,
29 CATO J. 131, 137–38 (2009).
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3. In a Too-Big-to-Fail Environment, Regulators Must
Reexamine How They Monitor and Regulate Bank Risk
“[E]ven if TARP saved our financial system from driving off
a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car.”
—Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General for TARP297
“If stupidity got us into this mess, then why can’t it get us
out?”
—Will Rogers, commenting on the crash of 1929298
Mr. Barofsky offered his pessimistic view in 2010, prior to
congressional passage of the Dodd-Frank regulatory reform
law. This Act, which is over 2300 pages in length, purports to
address the flaws and failures that contributed to the financial
crisis.299 However, unlike Glass-Steagall and the other depression-era laws that imposed outright prohibitions on activities
that were believed to have contributed to the financial crisis of
1929, Dodd-Frank creates a Financial Stability Oversight
Council and empowers it, in conjunction with the various government regulators, to determine which activities should be restricted or prohibited and what, if any, structural changes
should be required.300 Until the federal agencies have completed the mandatory studies and adopted regulations in areas
required by the law, it is impossible to assess or even predict its
impact. In effect, an assessment of Dodd-Frank today would be
the equivalent of writing a restaurant review based upon the
restaurant menu, before the food is prepared, let alone served
and eaten.
Dodd-Frank addresses the problem of too-big-to-fail banks
in several ways. For example it requires large banks (and systemically important nonbank financial companies) to prepare a
plan for orderly resolution (analogous to a living will).301 The
297. SIGTARP QUARTERLY REPORT, January 2010, supra note 52, at 6.
298. Quoted in LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO
BROKE THE WORLD 347 (2009).
299. See Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Passes
Major Overhaul of Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 14244093.
300. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1395–96 (2010).
301. See id. § 165(d)(1).
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Act also requires the Fed to consider, in any bank merger, its
impact on the financial stability of the United States and the
Fed must determine that the acquiring bank is well capitalized
and well managed.302 In very limited circumstances, when a
systemically important bank or nonbank financial company
poses a “grave threat” to financial stability, the Financial Stability Oversight Council may—by a two-thirds vote (which
must include the Secretary of the Treasury)—place restrictions
on banking activities or require the company to sell off assets or
subsidiaries.303 As is typical of the Act, these provisions provide
regulatory discretion.304 While regulators in the near term may
carefully monitor the size of banks, the long history of banking
regulation has reflected support for bank mergers and consolidation, particularly in response to a crisis.
Similarly, Dodd-Frank provides expansive authority to aggressively regulate bank risk taking. Under the Act, the Fed is
authorized to adopt higher prudential standards for banks with
assets above $50 billion dollars.305 Dodd-Frank also empowers
the Fed to set higher risk-based minimum capital requirements
for banks and, for the first time, countercyclical capital levels
for bank-holding companies.306
While it is difficult to argue against higher capital requirements, one must not assume that this will solve the problem. The magnitude of the problem will inevitably be influenced by the stability of the capital. As the history of banking
crises demonstrates, demand deposits (particularly wholesale
jumbo deposits) and capital secured by short-term borrowing in
the repo market may disappear in a crisis.307 Also, if the assets
purchased on leverage or funds loaned are highly risky, a sudden dramatic fall in market prices or loan defaults may wipe
out even a substantial capital cushion.
Higher minimum capital requirements may also increase,
rather than decrease, other forms of risk taking. As discussed,
when bank executives are compensated through stock, it
creates a substantial incentive to increase short-term perfor302. See id. §§ 604(d), 607(b).
303. See id. § 121(a).
304. See id.
305. See id. § 165(a)(2).
306. See id. § 616(a).
307. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 2, at 206 (noting that both Bear
Stearns and Lehman had adequate net capital, on paper, just days before their
respective failures).
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mance.308 One of the leading metrics for measuring bank performance is total return on equity (ROE).309 Simply put, when a
bank is required to retain higher levels of reserve capital, ROE
will fall unless a higher return on assets (ROA) is generated.
Higher ROA typically can only be attained by engaging in
higher-risk lending or trading. Therefore, a bank executive
seeking higher stock performance will be motivated to engage
in riskier banking practices in order to attain the same ROE.
Because a higher capital requirement may have the unintended consequence of encouraging greater risk taking, it is
important for regulators to reexamine the methods for calculating and regulating risk. In particular, regulators should reexamine their reliance upon value at risk (VaR) models to measure capital adequacy and their acquiescence in bank reliance on
derivatives such as CDSs to hedge risk. While VaR models are
useful at measuring and predicting known, quantifiable risks,
the past crisis demonstrated the danger of using these models
to measure the unquantifiable and unanticipated “long tail”
risks.310 Furthermore, because each firm has substantial latitude to develop its VaR, and more importantly to control the
data that is entered into the calculation, it is dangerous for
regulators to rely upon it exclusively.311
Most importantly, in a too-big-to-fail world, regulators
must focus on regulating bank business segments that inherently have a higher risk component. For example, the muchpublicized Volcker Rule, which ostensibly will prohibit banks
from engaging in proprietary trading and will limit bank sponsorship or investment in hedge funds, is a notable example of
this approach.312

308. See supra text accompanying notes 281–84.
309. See, e.g., DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS 299 (1988) (“Many
analysts consider ROE the single most important financial ratio applying to
stockholders and the best measure of performance by a firm’s management.”).
310. For a detailed discussion of VaR models and their limitations, see Joe
Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § MM (Magazine) at
24, available at 2009 WLNR 152510.
311. See id.
312. The Volcker rule in Dodd-Frank has a two-year delayed effectiveness,
followed by a two-year transition period. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619(c), 124 Stat. 1376,
1622–23 (2010). The Act also provides the Fed with broad latitude in defining
proprietary trading and expansive exemptive authority. See id. § 619(b)(2). As
such, the rule may have little impact on bank operations. At a minimum, it
will not be known for several years.
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Dodd-Frank also provides for regulation of OTC derivatives. In doing so, it authorizes the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC to establish minimum margin requirements for most swap transactions.313 However, it does not
address the problem of multiple CDSs written on a single security. As such, it will continue to be possible for exponentially
more investors to benefit from a credit default than would benefit from full payment of the obligation.
CONCLUSION
While the magnitude of the financial crisis in 2008 was
unprecedented, it followed a predictable pattern. Overly aggressive financial houses grew too rapidly by borrowing in the
short term and committing too much capital into a bubble market of securities and derivatives built on subprime mortgages.
The government predictably responded by engineering government-financed and assisted takeovers designed to halt a panic.
To the extent that the government engaged in well-established
techniques of lending money against sound collateral, and intervening in the secondary market to reestablish market pricing, the process worked. The banks were recapitalized. While
the secondary debt markets are not fully recovered (and may be
overly dependent on the Fed as a buyer), at least they are functioning.
Who benefited from the bailout? The narrow answer to the
question would be that the creditors and counterparties of
Bear, AIG, and the CPP banks on the verge of failure were the
principle beneficiaries. Unlike the creditors and counterparties
of Lehman, they received one hundred cents on the dollar. Executives and other employees in the financial sector were also
major beneficiaries. Bonuses were paid in most instances and
the compensation system in the financial sector continues,
largely as is. As a nation, we benefited by averting a financial
meltdown. In retrospect, the cost of the bailout was not great.
Even when factoring in the enormous non-TARP interventions
by the Fed and others, the final cost may be surprisingly small.
Of course, the shareholders in Bear, Lehman, AIG, Wachovia,
Washington Mutual, and others suffered.
Looking to the future, did our nation’s financial system
benefit? The verdict on systemic beneficiaries is less positive. In
all likelihood, the underlying problems have not been ad313. See id. § 713.

2011]

WHO BENEFITED FROM THE BAILOUT?

1613

dressed. While the Dodd-Frank Act provides regulators with
greatly expanded authority, it remains uncertain how this
power will be used. Banks that are too big to fail are larger today and, as such, future failures will be greater. Executive
compensation practices that encourage bank management to
seek growth at any cost have not been addressed. An unlimited
number of investors lacking an insurable interest in a security
can still buy derivative “insurance” with the consequence that a
failure of one MBS will result in a profitable return that is exponentially greater than the value lost on the underlying security.
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

